公平关切与损失规避对混合双渠道供应链订货策略的影响

Impact of Members' Fairness Preference and Loss-Averse on Order Strategy in Hybrid Dual-Channel Supply Chain

针对混合双渠道供应链成员公平关切与损失规避行为往往导致其订购决策偏离最优订购量的现象,构建考虑成员行为偏好和需求转移的混合双渠道供应链订购模型。运用纳什讨价还价博弈模型,研究公平关切行为对双方成员最优订购策略的影响,并在此基础上进一步分析零售商损失规避与公平关切行为对零售商订购决策的影响。理论分析与数值算例表明:当成员均存在公平关切行为时,制造商的订购量大于理性最优订购量,而零售商的订购量小于理性最优量;当制造商存在公平关切行为、零售商同时存在公平关切与损失规避行为时,零售商订购量变化幅度随损失规避系数的增大而逐渐减小,而随公平关切系数的增大先减少后增加;产品单位利润、产品转移率、单位缺货成本等因素会对由零售商行为偏好引起的订购量偏差产生不同程度的影响。

Considering the phenomenon that the order decision of supply chain members may deviate from the optimum leaded by loss-averse and fairness preference.The study,based on the behavioral preference,analyzes the optimal order quantity when the members take Nash bargain game by constructing a hybrid dual-channel order model with demand transfer,and the impact of retailer＇s lossaverse and fairness preference on its order decision as well.The result shows that the fairness preference manufacture order quantity is larger than the rational optimal quantity,whereas the fairness preference retailer order quantity is less than the rational optimal quantity.It shows as well,when facing the fairness manufacture,the order quantity deviations of the fairness preference and loss-averse retailer are decreased with the increase of loss-averse degree,while the deviations are decreased and then increased with the increase of fairness preference degree.Moreover,the different product natures（unit profit,transfer rate,shortage cost,et al）have disproportionate impacts on the order deviation.