摘要
针对一类以自主研发为主的后发企业面临的创新决策困局,从提升企业动态竞争优势视角剖析了破坏性创新与维持性创新的特征。根据地方政府同时扮演代理人和自利者双重角色的特征区分了不同的地方政府类型。建立了以企业利益最大化为优化目标的0一1非线性目标规划模型,量化了不同类型地方政府针对两种创新模式的激励政策,并以自行车厂案例对模型加以说明,证明提出的优化模型的可行性与合理性。
Aiming at innovation decision dilemma of a kind of self-research and development latecomer firm,the characteristics of disruptive innovation and sustaining innovation were analyzed from the perspective of the company's dynamic competitive advantages.Different local government types were distinguished according to characteristics of the dual roles that local government plays simultaneously in agent and self-interested.A 0 — 1 nonlinear programming model was built with profit maximization as the optimization objective,and quantifying incentives for two innovative modes under different local government types.A case study of bicycle was reported to demonstrate the feasibility and rationality of this approach.
出处
《工业工程与管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2016年第6期163-167,175,共6页
Industrial Engineering and Management
基金
国家社科基金重点资助项目(15AGL024)
天津市科技发展战略研究重点资助项目(14ZLZLZF00008)
关键词
破坏性创新
维持性创新
后发企业
地方政府
disruptive innovation
sustaining innovation
latecomer firm
genetic algorithms