摘要
基于电动汽车充电设施投资对电动汽车需求的扩张效应,分别建立Cournot和Stackelberg的充电设施投资市场中政府和私人企业投资的双寡头博弈模型。对比两个模型结果发现,政府与企业均在Cournot博弈模型下获得更大利润,而在Stackelberg模型下电动汽车充电设施投资总量更大。基于某市电动汽车实际应用的相关数据进一步分析发现,需求扩张效应刺激政府与私人企业对电动汽车充电设施的投资,当环境因素比社会财富更重要时,政府应成为市场引导者,推动市场中充电设施的投资。
Based on the demand expansion effect of electric vehicle charging facilities investment on electric vehicle de- mand, a duopoly investment game model between government and private enterprise in the charging facilities market is es- tablished, and both Cournot game and Stackelberg game are analyzed. Comparing the results of the two models, we found both the government and the enterprise obtain higher profit in the Cournot game, but the total investment amount of electric vehicle charging facilities is higher in Stackelberg model. Based on the numerical analysis of a certain city＇ s electric vehi- cle application real data, demand expansion effect will enlarge the investment amount of the government and the private en- terprise. When environmental issue is more important than social wealth, the government should act as the market leader to promote the electric vehicle facility investment.
出处
《科技管理研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第2期207-214,共8页
Science and Technology Management Research
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目"制造商产能变化对JIT供应物流的影响及稳健响应机制研究--以汽车行业为例"(71402048)
博士后面上项目"基于筛选和元模型的大型昂贵性物流仿真系统优化设计"(2015M582228)
