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基于IPD博弈的创业型大学与企业合作行为演化的仿真分析

Simulation Analysis on Evolution of Cooperative Behavior between Entrepreneurial Universities and Enterprises on the Base of IPD Game
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摘要 分析创业型大学、产学合作演化、重复囚徒困境(IPD)博弈及其演化策略的研究现状,基于非对称IPD博弈,构建创业型大学与企业合作行为演化博弈模型,并引入"一报还一报"(TFT)经典演化策略,采用Netlogo多主体仿真工具,深入分析TFT策略对该产学合作行为演化的促进作用,研究发现,在运用TFT经典演化策略和其他条件不变的前提下,合作者密度、参与者数量、空间范围对合作行为演化具有无、正向和负向的影响,而收益分成系数的影响具有非线性的特征,最后,从博弈主体和政府二个层面给出对策建议。 This paper analyzes the present research situation of entrepreneurial university, evolution of university - industry cooperation ( UIC), iterated prisoners dilemma (IPD) and its evolution strategy at first, then based on the asymmetric IPD game and simulation platform Netlogo, builds the Multi - Agent simulation model of Evolution of Cooperative Behavior be- tween Entrepreneurial Universities and Enterprises , introduces the classical evolutionary strategy "TIT FOR TAT" (TFT) , and carries a deep analysis on a positive role of TET in promoting Behavioral Evolution of the UIC. With application of the classical evolutionary strategy TFT and other conditions remaining unchanged, research result shows that the evolution of co- operative behavior is uncorrelated with corporate collaborators density, positively correlated with participants' numbers, negatively correlated with the space scope; the influence of revenue - sharing coefficient is of nonlinear characteristics. Fi- nally in this basis, respectively from the game body and the government level it gives some specific suggestions.
出处 《科技管理研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2017年第2期241-248,共8页 Science and Technology Management Research
基金 国家自然科学基金项目"外部创新要素异质性对开放式创新绩效的影响机理研究"(71272171) 安徽高校人文社科研究重点项目"新常态下安徽物流业服务创新能力提升的研究"(SK2015A480) 高校优秀中青年骨干人才国内外访学研修重点项目(gxfxZ D2016208) 合肥学院人才科研基金项目"产学研合作提升新兴产业创新能力的途径和机制研究"(15RC19)
关键词 创业型大学 产学合作 非对称博弈 囚徒困境 一报还一报 entrepreneurial Universities university - industry cooperation ( UIC ) asymmetric game prisoner's dilem- ma TIT FOR TAT (TFT)
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