摘要
将政治冲击、制度效率与企业创新纳入统一框架,选取2007-2013年沪深A股上市公司数据,考察了主政官员更替所产生的政治冲击对企业创新的影响,以及制度效率对该影响的调节作用。研究发现:主政官员更替所产生的政治冲击会显著促进企业创新,有效提升企业的创新意愿和创新力度,而较高的制度效率(市场化和法制化水平)可以有效强化该促进作用;政治冲击程度越高,促进作用就越强;国有产权性质会弱化这种促进作用,而民营企业会通过加快内生增长、加强自主创新应对政治冲击。
Putting political shocks, institutional efficiency and corporate innovation into a unified framework and using the firms listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-share markets from 2007 to 2013, we investigate the influence of political shocks due to the change of officials in power on firms' RD, and how the institutional efficiency adjust the above influence. We hypothesize and demonstrate that political shocks caused by the turnover of officials in power will significantly promote the business innovation which is that political shocks will effectively enhance the willingness and degree of innovation. Furthermore, the better institutional efficiency such as the higher quality of market and law effectively strengthen the above promotion. We further find that the greater the degree of political shocks based on the characteristics of the officials turnover, the stronger the promotion function. However, the nature of stateowned property can weaken such promotion function. Compared to the SOEs, private firms are more likely to strengthen the endogenous growth and improve the ability of independent innovation in response to political shocks.
出处
《山西财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第1期1-14,共14页
Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71472041)
关键词
主政官员更替
政治冲击
制度效率
企业创新
change of officials in power
political shocks
institutional efficiency
corporate innovation