中国式卖空机制与公司创新——基于融资融券分步扩容的自然实验

Chinese Short Selling Mechanism and Corporate Innovation:A Natural Experiment from Chinese Margin Trading Program

本文基于双重差分模型,以我国融资融券标的股票分步扩容为自然实验事件,系统考察了卖空机制对公司创新行为的影响效应及其价值机理。研究发现,融资融券制度的实施并没有显著影响公司的创新投入,却显著提升了公司的创新产出,表明融资融券制度具有"创新激励效应",能够显著提升公司的创新效率。其次,融资融券制度的"创新激励效应"在信息不透明公司、低管理层权力公司及垄断程度强行业表现地更加显著。最后,融资融券制度的实施能够通过创新渠道产生滞后的"价值提升效应"。本文结论总体证实,中国式卖空机制(融资融券制度)的实施符合"约束假说"而非"压力假说",卖空机制具有显著的创新激励效应和价值提升效应。

Based on a natural experiment of the stock distributionexpansion in China's margin tradingand the difference-indifference models, this paper systematically examines the effect of short selling on innovative behavior of companiesand its value mechanism. The study finds that the implementation of margin trading program does not significantly affect the corporate investment in innovation, but significantly improves the corporate innovation output, which shows that the margin trading program has an innovation incentive effect that can significantly enhance corporate innovation efficiency. Secondly, the 'innovation incentive effect' of the margin trading programs are stronger in information-opaque com-panies, low management power companiesand companies in monopolized industries. Finally, the implementation of margin trading program can produce lagged value enhancement effectthrough innovation channels. The overall conclusion confirms that the implementation of Chineseshort selling(margin trading program) supports the' constraint hypothesis 'rather than' pressure hypothesis ', and the short selling mechanism has a significant innovation incentive effect and value enhancement effect.