董事高管责任保险与公司的代理问题——基于上市公司研发投入的实证研究

Does D & O Insurance Decrease Agency Problem in Listed Companies?——A Empirical Study Based on Listed Companies' R & D Investment

以2007-2014年中国A股上市公司为样本,采用面板数据固定效应回归分析方法,对董事高管责任保险购买如何影响研发投入以及第一大股东持股比例的调节作用进行了实证检验。实证结果表明:董事高管责任保险购买会降低公司的研发投入水平,且第一大股东持股比例能够削弱这种影响;作为一种在西方广受青睐而于近十年间被逐步引入中国的公司治理机制,董事高管责任保险尚未完全发挥出其治理效应和作用,未能真正降低公司的代理问题,相反还具有强化董事和高管机会主义动机和行为的负面影响。

Based on a sample consisting of China＇s listed companies which issue A-share from 2007 to 2014, this paper employs fixed effect regression method of panel data to empirically examine how D ＆ O insurance buying affects R ＆ D investment and the moderate effect of the largest shareholder＇s share ratio. It finds that, D ＆ O insurance buying can decrease a listed firm＇s R ＆ D investment, and this relationship is weakened by the largest shareholder＇s share ratio. As a corporate governance which was widely welcomed in the West and was gradually introduced to China in the last decade, D ＆ O insurance did not fully play its role and was unable to lower the company＇s agency problem. Instead, it strengthened the directors and senior executives＇ opportunistic motivations and behaviors sometimes.