康德论对自我的意识:内感官的对象及其问题

Kant on the Consciousness of Self: the Objects of Inner Sense and Its Issues

在《纯粹理性批判》中,康德提出与外感官相对应的内感官机能,外感官可以获得关于外在对象的表象,而内感官是一切表象的来源,包括外感官所提供的,以及内感官对自身的直观所获得的。但这并不表明内感官具有自身的感性杂多的来源,它的全部内容都来自外感官,也正是在此基础上,内感官可以形成对自我的表象。内感官的作用源于它在内部为想象力的综合所刺激,并且同样是该刺激使得内感官得以直观自身。这种直观所获得的关于自身的表象并不是与统觉相对应的先验自我,而仅仅是一种经验的自我意识,它变动不定,不具有持存的实体性,并且只是关于"自我"的现象。而通过统觉所意识到的"我思"则必然地包含"我"的存在,正是在此意义上,"我在"与现象背后的我自体产生矛盾或冲突。

In the critique of pure reason, Kant put forward the function of inner sense, which is correspondent to the outer sense. Through outer sense, we can obtain the representations of outer objects, while inner sense is the source of all the representations, in- cluding which is offered by outer sense and the intuition of itself. This does not mean inner sense has its own source of sensible mani- fold, but rather all of its contents come from outer sense. Insofar inner sense could have the representations of selves based on this. The action of inner sense is inwardly caused by the affection of imagination, and it is equally this affection make the inner sense could intuit the self. The representation of self attained by this intuition is not the transcendental self which corresponds to apperception. In- stead, it is merely a kind of empirical self - consciousness. It is changeable and has no persistent substantiality, as well as it is only the phenomenon of the ＂self＂. Nevertheless, the ＂I think＂ which we are aware of via apperception inevitably contains the existence of ＂I＂. In this sense, the ＂I am＂ conflicts with the I -in- itself which is behind the phenomenon.