康德的阴影与费希特的超越--重审知识学的最高原则

The Shadow of Kant and Transcendence of Fichte:The Highest Principle of Wissenschaftslehre Revisited

在1787年出版的《纯粹理性批判》的第二版的"超验演绎"部分,康德着力考察了知性范畴的运用条件,从而引出了对于观念论哲学极为重要的自我意识的难题。作为康德哲学问题意识的直接继承者,费希特在他的知识学系统中直接将在康德那里仍然处于后设问题的自我意识论题中心化,试图摆脱康德哲学中过于浓重的传统哲学的阴影,以崭新的方式去处理这一论题。以费希特于耶拿时期写作的两版"知识学"中关于最高原则公式的讨论为中心展开考察,可以揭示在何种意义上费希特解决了康德遗留的困难并超越了旧的哲学问题域的。

In the 'transcendental deduction'of Critique of Pure Reason,2nd edition,published in the year of 1787,Kant's attempts in interpreting the conditions for the use of categories of understanding generated the thesis of self-consciousness,which would be crucial for the later-called idealist philosophy.As the direct philosophical successor of Kant,Fichte attempted to centralize the thesis of self-consciousness within his own system of Wissenschaftslehre,although the very thesis still remained as a meta-problem for Kant.Fichte's philosophical project aimed at getting rid of Kant's shadow and bringing out the thesis of self-consciousness in a bright new way.The interpretation here focused on the discussion concerning the fundamental principle before and in Fichte's Jena systems of Wissenschaftslehre,is intended to reveal that how Fichte resolves the antinomies left by Kant and transcends the old problem domain of philosophy successfully.