经理人市场化能抑制国企高管腐败吗?——经理人市场竞争对公司高管权力和行为约束效应分析

Can the Marketization of Manager Constrain State-owned Enterprises' Executive Corruption? ——An Analysis of the Effect of Manager Market Competition on Executive Power and Behavior

本文利用2004-2014年间证券交易所和媒体披露的高管腐败案例样本,从经理人市场化的地区、行业差异的角度出发,分析经理人市场竞争对公司高管权力和行为的约束效应。研究结果表明:经理人市场竞争约束企业高管腐败行为的作用在东部地区比中西部地区强、在非垄断行业比垄断行业强;经理人的市场竞争对民营企业高管的腐败行为有所约束,这种约束作用会随地区和行业经理人市场化程度的增高而加强;但由于我国国有企业经理人市场失灵,经理人市场竞争约束并不能抑制国有企业高管的腐败行为。

Taking cases of executives corruption disclosed by stock exchange corporations and media from 2004 to 2014 as samples,and based on the differences of districts and industries of the managerial labor market competition,this paper tests the constrained impacts of the managerial labor market competition on executive＇s power and behaviors. The results show that the managerial labor market competition＇s constrain effects on executive corruptions is stronger in the east regions than in the central and west regions,in the non-monopoly industries than the monopoly industry; the managerial labor market＇s competition has some constrain on private corporate executive corruptions,and the constrain effects increases while the degree of the region and industry managerial labor market become strong; as to the failure of the state-owned enterprise managerial labor market,the managerial labor market does not constrain the state-owned enterprises＇ executive corruptions.