摘要
基于第一类代理问题,对家族企业CEO性质对环境不确定性下资本配置效率的影响进行研究。结果发现:环境不确定性会降低企业资本配置效率,此效应仅发生在职业经理人担任CEO时;当家族成员担任CEO时,环境不确定性对资本配置效率的负向影响会得到一定抑制。
Based on Type I agency problems,this paper examines the effect of CEO status of family firm on the relation between uncertainty and capital allocation efficiency. Results show that,capital allocation efficiency is low under uncertainty only when CEOs are professional managers. The negative effect of uncertainty on capital allocation efficiency is weakened when CEOs are family members.
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第1期53-57,共5页
Soft Science
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究西部和边疆地区青年基金项目(14XJC790001)
