上市公司控制权配置效率的比较分析——基于帕累托标准、希克斯标准与利益相关者标准

Allocation Efficiency of Control Rights of Listed Corporations:A Comparative Analysis Based on Pareto Criterion,Hicks Criterion and Stakeholder Criterion

资本市场的并购行为导致公司控制权的重新配置,而基于不同治理结构与契约关系的控制权配置会产生不同的效率。控制权配置的效率评价具有不同的选择标准,传统的帕累托标准和希克斯标准仅仅考虑到股东的利益变化,而利益相关者标准则扩展了利益变动的主体范围。虽然不同的效率标准与股东至上逻辑具有相容性,同时在一定的条件下可以相互转化,但由于利益相关者标准依据的是社会福利观,并且与之对应的是一种更为有效的公司治理结构,因而是最优的效率选择。

Merger and Acquisition can cause re-allocation of corporation's control rights in capital market,and the allocation of control rights on the basis of different governance structure has different efficiency.The different criteria are used to evaluate the allocation efficiency of control rights,the traditional Pareto criterion and Hicks criterion only think about the stockholder's interests,but the paper puts forward stakeholder criterion which expands the scope of interest groups.This paper thinks that though different criterion and shareholder primacy logic is compatible and mutual transformable,stakeholder criterion is an optimal selection because it is corresponding with social welfare standpoints and more efficient government structure.