财务分析师跟进有利于标准审计意见形成吗?——来自中国证券市场的经验证据

Does Analyst Coverage Help Firms to Form Standard Auditing Opinions?——Empirical Evidence from Chinas Security Market

文章从分析师作为信息媒介和外部治理作用出发,分析了分析师跟进对标准审计意见形成的理论影响,并用2007~2014年中国上市公司数据进行了实证检验。分析师跟进提供的私有信息增强了审计师的谈判能力,提高了管理层接受审计师意见的可能性;分析师跟进对管理层行为形成的约束,使得管理层提供较高质量的财务报表,有利于审计师与管理层达成共识。因此,分析师跟进有助于审计师出具标准意见的审计报告,研究的实证证据支持了这个结论。这意味着分析师不仅是私有信息的提供者,而且其行为有利于资本市场高质量财务信息的传播。

By considering financial analysts as information media and outside governance mechanism, the paper analyzes the theoretical influence of analyst coverage on the formation of standard auditing opinions, and an empirical test is made by using the data of China＇s listed firms from the year 2007 to 2014. The private information provided by analyst coverage improves the ne- gotiation ability of auditors, and the possibility for managerial levels to accept the opinions of audi- tors. Analyst coverage also brings constraints to managers, requesting them to provide high quality financial statements, which is helpful for the managers and auditors to reach consensus. There- fore, analyst coverage can help auditors to provide auditing reports with standard opinions. The empirical evidence of the paper further proves the conclusion. This indicates that analysts are not only private information providers, their behaviors can also be helpful to the spread of high quality accounting information in the capital market.