公司治理改革、产品市场竞争与公司价值

Corporate Governance Reform,Product Market Competition and Firm Value

在基于对不同类型的委托-代理问题("盲目扩张"、"管理层安于现状"和"浪费、挪用企业资源以享受控制权收益")分析的基础上,采用倾向得分匹配法和倍差分析法分析了我国2001年实施的公司治理改革对上市公司价值的影响。研究发现,公司治理改革对上市公司价值的正影响在国有股份较多的企业中相对较弱。但是,产品市场竞争可以促进公司治理改革对提高国有企业价值的影响的有效性。上述发现表明,由于公司治理改革中包含的传统的公司治理机制对减少表现为"盲目扩张"和"浪费、挪用企业资源以享受控制权收益"的委托-代理问题更有效,而国有企业中更有可能存在表现为"管理层安于现状"的委托-代理问题。因此,公司治理改革对提高国有企业价值的影响比对提高民营企业价值的影响相对更弱。但是,由于产品市场竞争是解决"管理层安于现状"问题的有效机制,加强产品市场竞争有助于更好地发挥公司治理改革在解决国有企业中委托-代理问题的作用。

Based on the analyses on the three different kinds of agency problems（ ＂empire-building＂,＂enjoying quiet life＂and ＂stealing＂）,with the differences-in-differences approach and propensity-score matching approach,this paper estimates the impact of the corporate governance reform（ CGR） enacted in 2001 in China on firm value. The results show that the positive impact of the CGR on firm value is weaker when firms with more state ownership. But the impact of the CGR on firms with state ownership in more competitive product market is greater than the firms in less competitive product market. These findings suggest that the traditional internal corporate governance mechanisms covered by the CGR could be more effective for solving the agency problem of ＂empire-building＂and ＂stealing＂,but less effective for solving the agency problem of＂enjoying quiet-life＂. Since the agency problem of＂enjoying quiet-life＂is more likely to occur in firms with state ownership,the potential positive impact of CGR on firm value will be lower for firms with state ownership.In addition,since product market competition is considered as an important mechanism for eliminating the＂enjoy quiet-life＂problem,strengthening product market competition may enhance the efficiency of the impact of the CGR on enhancing state-owned enterprises＇ firm value.