通货膨胀目标制对牺牲率的作用研究——从中央银行信誉度的视角

Inflation Targeting on Sacrifice Ratio: Based on Credibility of Central Bank

自上世纪70年代的"美元危机"爆发以来,通货膨胀问题就不断地出现在各大大小小的经济体中,研究和应对通胀问题便成为了各中央银行在制定政策时最重要的参考之一。而90年代出现的通货膨胀目标制似乎成为了化解通货膨胀对经济表现影响的一种有效途径,回归初衷来说,在通货膨胀已是无法避免的前提下,治理通货膨胀的成本——牺牲率就是研究的重点。文中将这二者结合,通过中央银行信誉度的视角研究通货膨胀目标制对牺牲率的作用,搜集最新的数据、建立修改后的模型识别反通货膨胀区间、计算牺牲率SR值,最后对其结果进行简明的实证研究,试图分析问题和展示文中的结论。在"十三五"期间,我国面临经济增速放缓、调结构的局面,有力的财政政策少不了货币政策来提供流动性的配合,希望通过提供这样的研究,能够为研究央行决策提供一种思考问题的角度。

There have been inflation problems in economies all around the world since 1970s that “ the dollar crisis” arose. To study and deal with inflation became one of the most important references when central banks were making monetary policies. Inflation targeting that first created in 1990s seems to be one effective way to manage the performance on economy from inflation. Moreover,go on with what we are facing, sacrifice ratio （that measures the costs associated with slowing down economic output to change inflationary trends） should be the key point with the fact that inflation is inevitable. Our study tried to find how inflation targeting works on sacrifice ratio through credibility of central bank. After data collecting, modeling to identify the disinflations and calculating the SR values,we do a simple and clear regression on SRs to find the determinants. During the period of “the 13th Five - Year Plan”, China is confronted with the growth rate of GDP slowing down and the economic restructuring, meanwhile forceful fiscal policy should follow proper monetary policy. We hope this paper can provide a new angle to the study on policy making by central bank.