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信息不对称对农村学生健康卫生服务需求的影响研究——以眼镜为例 被引量:3

Effect of information asymmetry on demand of health care among rural students:A study on spectacles
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摘要 信息不对称问题在健康卫生领域普遍存在。在农村学生眼镜使用方面,信息不对称的一种表现形式是学生有"戴眼镜会伤害视力"的错误认知。基于对西北农村地区2 248名初中生的调研数据,研究发现,近四成学生有"戴眼镜会伤害视力"这种错误认知。这种错误认知显著阻碍了学生对眼镜的使用,使学生的戴镜率和配镜率都显著降低。农村学生眼镜市场"市场失灵"的10%可由"戴眼镜会伤害视力"这种错误认知解释。 Information asymmetry is a key problem existing in health care market.One kind of information asymmetry about spectacles for rural students is the misperception that spectacles will be harmful to vision.We conducted a survey sampling2248 students from western rural junior high school in 2013.Our analysis showed that about forty percent of students believed that spectacles were harmful to their vision.This misperception was quite a barrier to accessing spectacles.The students with this misperception had lower ownership and usage of spectacles than the students without.Ten percent of students' spectacles "market failure" are caused by this misperception that spectacles are harmful to vision.
作者 聂景春 庞晓鹏 周国栋 NIE Jing-chun PANG Xiao-peng Zhou Guo-dong(Renmin University of China ,Beijing 100872,China)
出处 《中国农村卫生事业管理》 2016年第12期1583-1587,共5页 Chinese Rural Health Service Administration
关键词 信息不对称 错误认知 眼镜 农村学生 市场失灵 information asymmetry misperception spectacles rural student market failure
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