股权价值高估企业应计与真实盈余管理行为选择

Choice of accrual and real earning management in equity value overestimate enterprise

文章以2003—2011年我国上市企业的7 921个观测值为样本,对股权价值高估企业应计与真实盈余管理行为选择进行研究发现,在股权持续高估前期,管理层选择调增利润的应计盈余管理行为,且分析师跟进对管理层的上述行为扮演着过度压力提供者角色。而在股权持续高估期间,管理层选择调减利润的真实盈余管理行为,将股价回归至内在价值,以免自身和企业遭受更严重的损失,分析师对管理层的上述真实盈余管理行为采取监督行为,但监督效果不显著。

This study uses 7 921 Chinese listed enterprises in 2003-2011 as observations and studies the choice of accrual and real earning management of enterprises whose equity were overvalued. This study finds that at the early stage of continually overvaluing period, the management personnel prefer to choose the behavior of accrual earnings management which can increase profits. And analysts play an role in bringing over stress on management personnel. But during the whole period of overvaluation stage, manager prefer to choose the behavior of real earnings management which can decrease profit, in order to lower the stock price to intrinsic value and prevent from more loss. And analysts can supervise the manager＇s real earnings management even though there is no significant effect of supervision.