国企高管腐败、风险信息与责任承担——基于党组织甄别免责动机的视角

Corruption of High-ranking Managers,Risk Information and Responsibility Undertaking: From the Perspective of Screening Liability Exemption Motive Function of Party Organization of State-owned Enterprises

立足于国企高管的腐败行为,探讨发生腐败行为的高管以风险信息为藉口的策略性信息披露对其责任承担的改变效应。在此基础上,将研究视角延伸至党组织的治理参与,进一步检验党组织针对腐败高管免责动机的甄别能力。结果发现:国企高管的腐败行为是风险信息披露的重要影响因素,因为腐败高管寄望于公司面临的多重风险压力为其腐败行为寻找借口;腐败高管在腐败发生年度多披露的风险信息显著降低了腐败高管在腐败暴露年度被惩罚的程度,风险信息在国企高管腐败行为中成为腐败高管的谋利工具;然而,党组织有效甄别了腐败高管利用风险信息免责的动机;当党组织参与治理的程度越大时,企图利用风险信息逃避责任的腐败高管反而受到了更为严厉的惩罚。

Base on corruption behaviors of high- ranking managers in listed companies,this paper probes into changing effects of tricky information disclosure of these high- ranking managers on their commitment of responsibility,and extends the study to management and participation of party organizations of state- ow ned enterprises,to further inspect party organizations＇ ability to identify liability exemption motives of these high- ranking managers. The results show that corruption behaviors of senior managers are important influence factors of risk information disclosure,because risks and pressures are used as excuses for high- ranking managers＇ corruption behaviors,which reflects difficulties during firms＇ operation. In the year of disclosing more risk information,the corruption of senior managers face lighter punishment. However,party organizations have the ability to identify liability exemption motives of these senior managers.When party organizations participate in corporate governance,high- ranking managers＇ corruption behaviors with more risk disclosure in firms face more severe punishment.