摘要
西方经济学中的监管理论无法为中国国有企业的监管问题提供有效的分析框架,这源于这些理论主要基于市场经济国家的监管经验,而无法捕捉到转型经济中国有企业监管的独特性。本文从转型国家国有部门的两个基本事实出发,推理出对国企监管者进行激励及约束的必要性和可能性,是转型经济中国企监管的独特之处;监管体制设计和政治环境是影响中国国有企业监管成效的重要因素。
The existing regulatory theory,which is rooted in western market economies,cannot provide a proper theoretical framework for the regulation issues of state-owned enterprise( SOE) in China. That is mainly because based on the regulation experience of market economies,the existing regulatory theory cannot capture the typical characteristics of SOE regulation in transition economy. Taking two stylized facts in transition economy as the logical starting point,this paper tries to prove that the possibility and necessity of motivating and constraining the regulators is one characteristic of SOE regulation in transition economy. Further,we argue that the regulatory regime and political environment are the important factors that can influence the efficiency of SOE regulation in China.
出处
《经济体制改革》
CSSCI
北大核心
2017年第1期179-183,共5页
Reform of Economic System
基金
汕头大学文科科研基金项目"基于信息经济学的国有企业监管体制研究"(2016)
汕头大学科研启动经费项目"基于机制设计的国有企业监管研究"(2016)
关键词
国企监管
监管理论
理论解释力
转型经济
regulation of state-owned enterprise
regulation literature
explanatory power
transition economy