群体性事件中参与主体的策略演化博弈分析——一种社会网络视角

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Participants' Strategies in Mass Incidents:A Social Network Perspective

本文在社会网络的视角下,尝试建立群体性事件中参与主体的策略演化博弈模型,并采用计算机仿真平台NetLogo进行模拟实验,分析了不同网络结构类型、群体关系、意见领袖、个体的利益差异以及收益关系等,对群体性事件中群体策略演化过程及其结果的影响。研究发现:具有小世界特性的社会网络更容易形成群体性事件;网络中群体关系越紧密,且小团体越少,群体性事件的策略选择越趋于一致;意见领袖作为暴力抗争策略发起者的网络更容易导致群体性事件的形成,但不排除其他非意见领袖节点也具有相似的作用;网络个体的利益差异影响参与群体的规模,但不影响群体性事件的形成;参与暴力抗争的代价决定着群体最终的群体性事件的策略选择。

In the view of social network, this paper proposes an evolutionary game model of participants' strategies in mass incidents, and uses the computer simulation platform NetLogo to conduct a simulation experiment. We analyze different types of network structure, group relations, opinion leaders, individual interests distribution and income of strategies, to demonstrate that a full understanding the process of strategy evolution and its results. It is found that: firstly, social networks with small-world properties are more likely to trigger mass incidents. Secondly, the closer the relationship among people in the network and the smaller the group, the more consistent the strategy choices in group are. Thirdly, opinion leaders, as initiators of violent protest tactics, are more likely to lead to the formation of mass incidents, but other nodes may also play the same role. Fourthly, the distribution of individual interests influences the size of groups, but does not influence the process of mass incidents. Fifthly, the cost of participation in violent protest determine the final decision of group.