独立董事网络与上市公司现金持有

Independent Directors′ Network and Chinese Listed Firms′ Cash Holding

本文研究独立董事网络对企业现金持有量的影响。运用1999—2012年的中国上市公司为样本,我们发现,独立董事的关系网络越强,公司现金持有量越少,支持了独立董事网络能以信息优势提升其咨询职能从而降低现金持有量的观点。从产权性质上来看,这种影响主要体现在民营企业中;从货币政策来看,这种影响在货币政策紧缩时更为明显。在进一步的研究中,我们为独立董事网络影响现金持有量提供了可能的路径:独立董事网络能够缓解公司的融资约束,表现为降低公司的投资-现金流敏感性和KZ指数。结果还表明独立董事网络对现金的影响呈现出非线性的特性,独立董事网络并非越大越好,其对现金持有量的影响呈现出先强后弱的U型曲线。本文以独立董事网络咨询职能降低公司现金持有量的研究回应了"花瓶董事"的观点,有助于投资者进一步认识中国情景下独立董事的作用,同时拓展了关于企业现金持有量和现金管理的研究。

In this paper, we test the relationship between independent directors＇ network and firms＇ cash holding. We find independent directors can utilize their network to acquire more information and thus help firms hold less cash to prepare for firm-specific risk. We also test such relationship in different settings. We find this relationship primarily exists in non-state-owned firms rather than state-owned firms. In the time period when government adapts tight-monetary policy, this relationship becomes weaker. We also obtain some corroborating evidence that direc- tors＇ network helps firm to alleviate financial constrain. It helps firms to decline investment-cash sensitivity and financial constrain index calculated from KZ factors. Moreover, the relationship between independent directors＇ network and cash holding may be non-linear, which exhibits a U shape relationship. Overall, our paper shows the evidence that independent directors of the listed companies in China do not serve only as the ＂vases＂ in the governing of their company and our findings also expands researches about firms＇ cash holding, enriching the understanding about independent directors＇ advisory role.