技术进步与经理人的风险承担——基于开放式基金采用XBRL的证据

Technological Change and Managerial Risk Taking：Evidence from the XBRL Mandatory Adoption at Mutual Fund Industry in China

从2010年开始,中国证监会强制要求所有的基金公司摈弃PDF作为信息披露的格式,而统一采用XBRL作为唯一的披露语言。这种信息披露方式的技术进步对开放式基金经理人的风险承担究竟有何影响？基于此,本文采用中国开放式基金的数据,考察XBRL的强制采用对基金经理人风险承担的影响。研究结果表明：采用XBRL之后,在以规避失业风险为主导的熊市中,与绩效排名靠前的基金经理人相比,排名靠后的基金经理人更倾向于规避风险;反之,在以薪酬激励为主导的牛市中,与绩效排名靠前的基金经理人相比,排名靠后的基金经理人更倾向于追求风险。本研究结论得到的启示是,信息披露的技术进步有助于提升市场的资源配置效率。

At the beginning of 2010,CSRC forced fund companies adopt XBRL as the only information discovery language in China.This paper uses data from mutual fund industry and examines the influence on managerial risk taking from compensation incentives and unemployment risk.Our empirical results show that managerial risk taking is mainly from the relative importance of both incentives.After XBRL adoption,when unemployment risk dominates,worse underperforming fund managers incline to significantly improving lower risk relative to managers with better performance to avoid potential unemployment.While compensation incentives are more important,worse underperforming fund managers tend to significantly improve risk relative to managers with better performance.