城市基层治理对行政协商机制的“排斥效应”

The Research on the Exclusive Effect to the Administrative Deliberation of Urban Grassroots Governance

作为协商民主的一种次形态,行政协商机制是兼具中央推动与基层适应的政策,但依然受到了基层行政组织的排斥。理解这种"排斥效应"的关键是对城市内各级政府(行政组织)在治理过程中的互动进行探究。本文对F市M社区与S市T社区进行双案例研究,以"双尾设计"为原则,选取两个差异特征较为明显的案例进行差别复制的检验。研究发现,城市纵向政府间的"权责倒置"机制是造成行政协商机制被城市基层治理所排斥的关键原因。对"权责倒置"机制的分析将有助于调整城市内的纵向政府间关系,为突破城市基层治理中"政府-社会"关系的内在张力提供方向,为城市基层行政协商机制与协商民主制度的建设提供理论层面的支持。

The objective of this paper is to examine the reason of exclusive effect to the administrative deliberation of urban grassroots governance. An exploratory double-case study, involving two communities in different institutional framework, which follow the principle of two-tail design,was conducted. The analysis reveals that the mechanism of 'Inversion of Rights and Responsibilities' in the vertical relationship among governments is a key reason which causes grassroots administrative organizations to exclude the mechanism of administrative deliberation. Based on this conclusion, the analysis also finds that the system of urban governmental mission is the key criteria of policy choices and rejection in the grassroots administrative organization. This study draws on the double-case approach to analyze the link the vertical relationship among governments inside city to the policy rejection of unban grassroots governance. The analysis of the mechanism of 'Inversion of Rights and Responsibilities' would contribute to adjustment of vertical relationship among governments inside city, providing direction to break through the tension between grassroots government and society. Meanwhile, this study would support the construction of administrative deliberation and deliberative democracy in the urban grassroots governance.