供应商技术研发决策行为的演化博弈分析——基于技术外部性的视角

Analysis of Supplier R&D Decision Behaviors Based on Evolutionary Game——A Technical Externalities Perspective

供应商在面向多制造商时研发共性技术还是研发专用技术?以此问题为基点,本文运用演化博弈论,在共性技术外部性、外部性引发价格战及政府干预治理情形下对供应商技术研发决策行为进行分析。研究发现:共性技术外部性的存在使得博弈演化稳定于由选择不同技术研发策略的供应商共存的均衡;在外部性引发价格战情形下,当外部性较强时,零部件降价幅度越大,供应商越倾向于选择研发专用技术,反之,当外部性较弱时供应商越倾向于选择研发共性技术;当考虑外部干预治理时,政府价格干预效果依该行为所引致的市场额外需求降低状况,而政府补偿干预有效引导着供应商选择共性技术研发策略。

Which do suppliers select when facing many manufacturers,generic or specific technology？ This paper builds an evolutionary game model to study the R＆D decisions behaviors of suppliers under the situations of generic technology externalities,price war caused by the externality and government intervention. The results show that different R＆D strategy pooling becomes the evolutionary stable strategy of game system due to the externality of generic technology. In price war situation,the bigger price fall for parts,the more possible suppliers develop specific technology with a high degree externality,the more possible suppliers develop generic technology with a small externality. In addition,the influence of government intervention in the price war on the selection of suppliers technology R＆D strategies depends on the market conditions caused by this intervention behavior,and government compensation intervention policy are beneficial to generic technology R＆D.