税收竞争、地方政府策略互动行为与招商引资

The Tactical Interaction,Tax Competition and FDI Competition among Local Governments

中国地方政府在分权体制和政绩考核压力下,通常都会采取吸引资本的方式来实现短期快速增长的目的。本文基于1994-2014年省级面板数据,应用空间计量模型考察我国地方政府为吸引资本,在税收方面的策略互动行为。主要发现包括:地方政府在主要收入来源的税种上,如增值税、所得税的税负水平表现出显著的空间策略互补特征,证明地方政府通过税收竞争来争夺资源,进行招商引资活动。而营业税表现出显著的空间策略替代特征。怎样规范辖区竞争,改变地方政府减税策略互动行为模式,有效遏制恶性竞争,对地区经济增长至关重要。

In the context of fiscal decentralization and political and economic performance evaluation in China, local governments tend to attract more capitals in order to promote local economic growth. Using a panel data set of China's 29 provincial administrative regions during 1994-2014, and spatial econometric approaches, this study examines the tactical interaction and the tax competition across China's localgovernments. We mainly find that there exist obvious tactical interactions in the overall tax. In addition,while spatial complementarity is found for the competition of value added tax and income tax, spatial substitution is found for the business tax.