委托代理的最优契约安排

Optimal contract arrangement of principal and agent

本文研究代理人的努力信息和市场的行情信息在委托人、代理人、仲裁人之间不同分布时委托代理的最优契约安排及其效应。与帕累托最优时的保险性合同条款相比,(1)在可观察可证实情形下,最优契约安排是设置以固定工资支付最大努力且具有强制效力的保险性合同条款;该情形的最优契约安排因信息完全对称而效率最高。(2)在不可观察不可证实情形下,最优契约安排是设置在固定工资的保险性合同条款的基础上增列产出分成的激励性合同条款;该情形的最优契约安排因信息完全不对称而效率最低。(3)在不可观察但可证实情形下,最优契约安排是设置除固定工资的保险性合同条款加产出分成的激励性合同条款之外再加进对有意偷懒则罚、额外努力则赏的赏罚性合同条款,该情形的最优契约安排因信息部分对称、部分不对称而效率折中。

Optimal contract arrangements and their effects were studied in different distributions of the agent＇s effort infor mation and market stochastic information among principal, agent and arbitrator. Compared with the Pareto optimal, （1） in observable and verifiable case, the optimal contract arrangement is setting mandatorily insurance terms in the form of fixed return to the maximum effort, and it is the most efficient because of complete symmetry of information; （2） in un- observable and unverifiable case, the optimal contract arrangement is setting incentive terms with risky output to share in addition to insurance terms, and it is least efficient because of complete asymmetry of information; （3） in unobservable but verifiable case, the optimal contract arrangement is setting rewarding-or-publishing terms in order to reward excess effort and punish intentional laziness in addition to the insurance and incentive terms, and it is moderately efficient because of partial symmetry and partial asymmetry of information.