代理人还是管家:基于博弈论的企业经理人努力水平与角色行为选择分析

Agent or Steward: An Analysis of Choices of Managers' Effort Level and Role Behavior Based on Game Theory

代理理论与管家理论对经理人的角色和努力水平有着相互对立的认知。在现实中,单从一个理论视角无法全面刻画经理人的角色行为选择和绩效水平,因此,有必要整合代理理论与管家理论,探讨影响经理人角色行为选择的影响因素。基于博弈论的分析结果表明,企业所有者给予经理人的激励性薪酬具有充分的竞争力时,将极大地提高经理人的努力程度;在经理人表现出管家行为时,企业所有者给予经理人分享努力绩效的机会将有助于提升经理人的努力水平,促进企业所有者的效用最大化。在代理理论情形下,企业所有者与经理人之间存在着混合策略纳什均衡;而在管家理论情形下,企业所有者与经理人之间存在着纯策略纳什均衡,有助于最大程度地降低代理成本,实现两者互利双赢。

There is a conflicting cognition of manager＇s role and his effort level between agency theory and stewardship theory. In reality, a single theoretical perspective cannot fully portray the role choice and performance level of the manager. Therefore, it is necessary to integrate agency theory and stewardship theory to explore the factors that influence the role behavior selection of the manager. Based on the game theory, the results suggest that when the incentive pay is sufficiently competitive, the enterprise owners can greatly improve the degree of manager＇s effort. At the same time, when the manager shows stewardship behavior, the opportunity to share the fruits of the efforts can improve the manager＇s effort level, and promote the utility maximization of enterprise owners. In the case of agency theory, there exists a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium between owners and managers, while in stewardship theory, there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium between owners and managers, and this equilibrium can help minimize agency costs and achieve a mutually beneficial relationship between both parties.