摘要
针对PPP项目运营阶段收益分配再谈判问题,运用博弈论中讨价还价模型,分析私人企业和政府部门的博弈互动机理,探讨双方策略选择对PPP项目可持续经营的影响,得出关于贴现因子的子博弈精炼纳什均衡解。然后提出提高合同完备程度,制定外部规制手段,建立和完善监管机制和植入关系治理等建议,以期对PPP项目收益分配再谈判问题提供理论参考。
According to the negotiate problems of income distribution in PPP project operation stage, this paper uses the model of bargaining game theory, analyzes the interaction mechanism between private enterprises and government departments, explores the influence of both strategies on sustainable management of the PPP project, obtains the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the discount factor. Then, proposes to enhance contract completeness, make external regulation, establish and perfect the supervision mechanism, implant relationship governance, provides theoretical reference for the renegotiation of income distribution of PPP project.
作者
任志涛
雷瑞波
REN Zhitao LEI Ruibo(School of Economics and Engineering, Tianjin Chengjian University, Tianjin 300384, Chin)
出处
《建筑经济》
2017年第1期37-41,共5页
Construction Economy
基金
天津市哲学社会科学规划项目(TJGL15-022)
天津城建大学教育教学改革与研究重点项目(JG-ZD-1506)