国有资本经营预算衔接法律机制的构建——以功能定位再思考为主线

Construction of State-owned Capital Operation Budget Cohesive Mechanism

《预算法》第5条规定,国有资本经营预算与一般公共预算、社会保险基金预算应当相互衔接。吊诡的是,预算法和其他财政法律未就如何衔接提供明确的规则指引。国有资本经营预算衔接面临法律规则缺位的窘境,不但使政府财政行为无所适从,还会影响有限财政资源的配置效率。此问题的解决之道暗含国有资本经营预算功能定位的本源性命题,学界对此颇有分歧,形成了"营利性"与"公共性"两大进路。事实上,在"中国语境"下,上述进路仍有商榷的空间。从历史发展脉络看,国有资本经营预算应当具备资本性和社会性功能,以此为根基科学合理地设计国有资本经营预算与其他预算在资金流动、科目设置、流转比例等法律规则。

Building the law system of modern finance and tax paves the way for enhancing National governance capabilities. In response to this trend, the budget Act must be on the road to modernization. Although the positive interaction and rational convergence among the budget should be core to the budget Act, the description about the related rules remains extremely rough. In this situation, we have to wonder the question how to link up State-owned capital operation budget, general public budge and the social security fund. We should find out the missed or ignored elements during the discussion on state-owned capital operating budget function positioning. If the above flaw is tenable, then how to justify the function positioning of the state-owned capital management budget？ On the basis of this, the arrangement of various budget rules could be clear. If the necessary links between budgets are not clear, how to scientifically and rationally design specific rules？ This article adopts data analysis, literature reorganization, historical induction as main research methods. Firstly, we reorganized the data that Ministry of Finance announced in the recent five years （2012--2015）, discovering that the national capital budget links up initially with other budgets. But the rule remains not clear. Secondly, we reorganized the recent studies about state-owned capital management budget, finding that there are imperfections in these academic studies. So we advocated a return to the Chinese context; Thirdly, we reviewed the reform of Chinese fiscal budget and the state-owned enterprise, discovering the internal and external factors which influence the function of state-owned capital management budget. When reorganizing the literature of state-owned capital management budget in recent years, we find that there is an extreme doubt on the function orientation of state-owned capital management budget, i. e. , torning between for-profit and public. The key argumentation is always made in accordance to a three-step pattern, for example, ＂the maximum of capital, state-owned capital, the state-owned capital＂ or ＂enterprises, state-owned enterprises, and capital to maximize the syllogism of linear logic, ignore the reform of state-owned enterprises＂ and at the same time, ignores the ＂Chinese elements＂ and ＂Chinese context＂ of the government budget reform. Without the Chinese context, we can＇t understand the function of the state-owned capital management budget. When we playback the forty-year-history of the state-owned enterprise reform, we find out that the logical beginning to establish the state-owned capital management budget is the question that the state-owned shareholder＇s surplus claim power and ＂the request-proxy＂ in the ever-changing state-owned enterprise. Based upon this, we proposed that the state-owned capital management budget has the capital function to realize the surplus claim power state-owned shareholder. With the rapid economic development of society, especially in the context of the tension between the expansion of government functions and the limited financial resources, the conflict between the social security system and limited supply of fund shows a trend of expansion. These exogenous factors require that the function of state-owned capital operation budget should be extended from capital functions to social functions. The limitations of tax, treasury and other government financial funding transfer the financial pressures to state-owned companies. Due to the nature of state-owned capital, state-owned enterprises and social responsibility, the state-owned capital operating budget has to get the social function that bridges the functions of the government and social security undertakings in the financing gap. The capital and social function are not completely adversarial, but may be unified in some class ranks. The capital function realizes the state-owned shareholder surplus claim power, and guarantees price the increment is in the first cis- position. The social function satisfies the needs of country and the public. Only when the capital function is guaranteed, it is possible to realize the social function. Otherwise, we cannot meet the public needs. We therefore try to construct a mechanism for the state-owned capital management budget, the general public budget, and the social insurance fund budge on the basis of the capital and social function. This method does not avoid the slight defect in the former analyses, but it provides an even more microscopic concrete solution to the problems in financial practice and the finance and taxation legal science. The innovation of this article is that the former research pays more attention to the logical function of stratification plane, however, neglects the historical source. When reviewing the history, we found the crux and constructed the dual division on the state-owned capital management budget.