战略性新兴产业共性技术协同创新的演化博弈——三重螺旋视阈下的研究

为了更好地促进战略性新兴产业的发展,弥补共性技术创新主体的缺乏,构建涵盖政府、企业、高校(科研机构)参与的、能够实现创新资源最大整合和优化的三重螺旋协同创新系统便成为理想的选择。在这一框架下,本文应用演化博弈理论,分析了有限理性下政府、企业和高校(科研机构)之间的博弈行为,探讨演化路径、稳定均衡策略及其影响因素的作用机理。结果表明:政府的激励和监督以及共性技术创新的超额收益、总成本和溢出效应等因素直接影响协同创新的概率,且存在最优的收益与成本分配比例使协同创新的概率最大化。因此,应该充分发挥政府的主导作用,并建立有效的企业和高校(科研机构)的协同机制,以便有效地促进协同创新系统向帕累托最优方向演化。

In order to promote the development of strategic emerging industries and make up for the lack of main bodies of generic technology innovation, the collaborative innovation system of triple helix, that is able to realize the largest integration and optimization of innovation resources, covering the participation of government, enterprise and university （scientific research institution） , has become the ideal choice. Under this framework, the evolutionary game theory is applied to analyze the game behaviors of limited rational government, enterprise and university （scientific research institution）, and the evolutionary path, stable equilibrium strategy, and impact factors are debated. The results show that the governmental incentive and supervision play an important role in promoting collaborative innovation, and the excess returns, total cost, spillover effect and other factors of generic technology innovation also have a direct influence on the probability of collaborative innovation. At the same time, the optimal allocation ratio of innovation benefits and costs can be calculated to maximize the possibility of collaborative innovation. Accordingly, the leading function of the government and the effective collaborative mechanism between enterprise and university （scientific research institution） are the key to promote the system of collaborative innovation to achieve Pareto optimality.