证券监管处罚、公司印象管理与CEO过度投资

Securities Regulation,Impression Management and CEO Overinvestment

证券监管处罚作为公司外生冲击事件,直接或间接影响违规公司未来的会计与财务行为。本文选取2006—2014年中国A股上市公司违规监管数据为研究样本,基于行为金融学理论,从声誉修复角度考察证券监管处罚对违规公司投资行为的影响。研究发现:(1)与未受处罚的公司相比,违规公司被处罚后倾向于过度投资,通过激进的投资行为对冲处罚的负面影响,借以修复公司受损形象,但导致公司投资效率下降,损害投资者利益;(2)CEO学历水平越高,上述现象越严重;(3)公司内部治理机制并未能有效约束高学历CEO的刺激反应。最后,使用匹配后双重差值分析、样本自抽样回归分析,以及不同子样本、不同匹配变量多重检验分析后,结果一致稳健。本文立足企业微观经济行为,拓展了证券监管处罚经济后果的研究视角。

As an exogenous shock to firms, securities regulation has effect on firm＇ s accounting and financial behaviors. This paper examines how securities regulation influences corporate＇ s investment decisions using a sample of Chinese A-share listed firms from 2006 to 2014. We find that firms punished, compared with those unpunished, tend to overinvestment for reputation repair,leading to significant decrease in investment efficiency. Also, the above findings are especially significant in firms with CEOs of high-level education. According to be- havioral finance theory, CEOs with high-level education are generally more self-respected, even overconfident some- times, valuing their professional reputation in the managerial labor market. Thus, they tend to behave aggressively in order to reduce their potential reputation loss owe to negative news, further endangering investors＇ inter- ests. Punishment from securities regulation damages firm＇ s image, as well as CEO＇ s reputation in the managerial la- bor market. To improve their images, firms and the CEOs are incline to do something to distract investors＇ attention, except for corrections themselves, e. g. firing incompetent CEO, or investing new projects. Different from previous lit- erature which examine the market reaction of investors or the corrections by firms, we test the potential economic outcomes of securities regulation from a more broad perspective beyond corrections themselves, examining firms＇ in- vestment behaviors after punishment. Actually, how securities regulation works depends on firm＇ s cognition as well as other personal traits of the CEO. The truth is, prevention is better than cure. Securities regulation induces costs, that＇ s what we examines in our paper. It＇ s better for the authorities setting rules to push firms set up efficient and strict corporate governance mechanism beforehand rather than mild punishment afterwards. There＇ re several theoret- ical stream concerning regulation. The first is the ＂Public interest theory＂, proposed by Pigou （1938）, coming up with the idea that asymmetric information, externality and monopoly lead to market failure, which could be restricted by external regulation in order to improve social welfare. In contrast, Coase （1960） proposed the Contracting Theory that problems that can＇ t be solved by the market could be resolved by the court of justice by implementing contracts justly. Stigler （1971） and Posner （1974） raised the Capture Theory,points out that the government regulation ac- companies with corruption and incompetence. What＇ s more, the government regulal terest groups, causing regulatory failure. Thus, courts and law enforcement are more ,tion is probably captured by in- important than regulators. A lot of literature attempt to combine free market with government regulation to confirm the boundary of securities regula- tion under different circumstances. The authorities need to make a trade-off between costs and benefits of securities regulation. The practical significance of this paper is that, in the context of the current emphasis on securities regula- tion, we need to fully assess the economic consequences of securities regulatory penalties, rationally considering the boundary of regulation. Our findings are consistent and robust by bootstrapping, or regressing by different matched groups ,which extend the economic outcomes of securities reaulation from canital market to corporate＇ s behaviors. So far, we have not yet formed a consensus on security regulation, debate existing between the legalization of free market and government intervention. This paper could be seen as a start point, and more questions concerning security regulation need to be explored in the near future. In China, what kind of forms for regulation is suited for the capital market, and under what conditions security regulation works, need to be tackled. And we also need to under- stand the nature of Chinese security regulation and how long it takes for us to establish healthy market mecha- nism. We should make feet-on-the-ground plans, cultivating disciplined market participants, including shareholders,managers, investors, analysts, brokers, encouraging them to take actions rather than speaking words.