跨体制社会资本与高管薪酬契约

Institutional-crossing Social Capital and Executive Compensation Contract

本文基于中国制度背景,以沪深交易所上市的民营企业为样本,研究高管的跨体制社会资本对其薪酬契约的影响。研究发现,具有跨体制社会资本的高管以及具有的跨体制社会资本在管理团队中越稀缺,其薪酬的绝对水平与相对水平更高。研究同时发现,高管跨体制社会资本的稀缺性与层级性存在替代效应。进一步研究发现,由于组织对跨体制社会资本高管的经营业绩有相对乐观的确定性预期,因此,在薪酬契约中支付了较高的确定性薪酬,而当企业业绩上升时,高管的薪酬并不显著地随着真实业绩的上升而上升,即跨体制社会资本降低了业绩上升时高管的薪酬业绩敏感性。不过,研究发现,这种现象存在于一定的业绩范围内,民营企业高管并没有因此存在薪酬的天花板效应。研究结果也确实发现,具有跨体制社会资本的高管取得了更好的企业业绩。本文研究结论在一定层面上反映了民营企业薪酬的市场化效率,通过薪酬机制与结构的调整实现与高管人力资本的耦合,可以更好地促进组织战略目标的实现。

The enterprise contract theory points out that ihe enterprise is a series of contractual relations. Due to the presence of transaction costs, the contract relationship is not complete, therefore there exist a phenomenon that the rights and obligations cannot be clearly defined by the contract in enterprise. As an important measure to solve the incompleteness of enterprise contract problem, corporate governance mechanism has been widely concerned. The incentive mechanism is the most important in the modern enterprise management mechanism, effective incentive mechanism can coordinate the conflict of interests of shareholders and management, reduce the agency cost between the shareholders and executives and encourage management to work diligently to increase shareholder wealth. However, executives are not homogeneous, they have different characteristics, including the social capital. In the face of the heterogeneity of executives, how to set up an effective compensation contract, to achieve the incentive and restraint of executives to promote the organization~ strategic objectives is important. In the process of market-oriented reform, China＇s internal and external system coexist and circulation. When people~ personal relationship network crosses the two systems, it will produce inter institutional social capital for them. In the process of economic restructuring, the government has a strong control on the allocation of economic re- sources. Due to the differences in property rights, the private enterprises are not likely to get the birthright of ＂pater- nalism＂ as state-owned enterprises do. In order to reduce the transaction cost and obtain the resources needed for the development of the private enterprises, private enterprises will seek trust and help through the social net- work. For private enterprises, the importance of social network on enterprise development is very obvious, in order to obtain a wider social network relationship, private enterprises are willing to pay a higher cost and price, which is an important way, to employ the executives who have social capital. In the management team, the institutional-crossing social capital is scarce for the private enterprise, it can bring the heterogeneity resources. For executives, compensation is an important personal capital return, the compensation contract is an important incentive and restraint mechanisms, executives with cross institutional society capital is a scarce resource for enter- prises, the enterprise has the resources dependence to it, so can this kind of dependence affect the formulation and the validity of the contract？ In this paper,we use the data of private enterprises in China to discuss the impact and mechanism of executives＂ institutional-crossing social capital on their compensation contracts from the micro level. Based on China institutional background ,the study found： Executive who has institutional-crossing social capital or his institutional-crossing social capital is scarcer in the management team, he gets more pay. Due to the organization＇ s optimistic expectation towards the institutional-cross- ing social capital executives, the company give them more fixed compensation, but when the enterprise performance rising, executive pay does not rise significantly. Which means institutional-crossing social capital reduces the pay performance sensitivity. And this phenomenon exist in a certain range, when the company＇s performance has been greatly improved, the compensation of executives with the institutional-crossing social capital will also be improved, private enterprise executives did not have the ceiling effect of compensation; the study also found executives with cross institutional social capital made a better corporate performance, which provides evidence for the effectiveness and fairness of the executive compensation contracts. The conclusion of this paper has strong significance. Private enterprises tend to employ executives who has institutional-crossing social capital, and give them a high sala- ry. Whether the phenomenon undermines the efficiency and fairness of executive compensation market, or will lead to unfair sense in the organization. The results showed that this change of compensation structure can be better matched with human capital and strength the incentive and restraint effect of the compensation mechanism, and does not undermine the efficiency of the compensation contract. Its essence is a strategic behavior of private enterpri- ses. Private enterprise is the most economical organization in the market economy of our country, and their market efficiency mechanism in the salary design is a good reference for other organizations. This paper provides evidence from the micro for the relationship between institutional-crossing social capital and executive compensation incentive contract, expands the research of executive compensation contract in related fields, and helps to further understand the micro mechanism of social capital to individuals and organizations.