持续经营审计意见、管理层自信与投资效率

Going Concern Opinions,Management Confidence and Investment Efficiency

文章以2003~2015年沪深A股上市公司数据为研究样本进行实证分析,研究我国上市公司持续经营审计意见与投资效率之间的关系,并检验管理层对持续经营审计意见导致的投资效率经济后果进行干扰的行为是否有效。研究发现:持续经营审计意见会抑制企业的投资过度行为,缓解投资不足;而管理层自信容易导致投资过度,恶化投资不足;被出具持续经营审计意见后,管理层自信导致的投资过度行为能受到良好的约束,而持续经营审计意见对投资不足的缓解作用并未受到管理层自信的显著影响,该现象在民营企业中表现得尤为突出。研究结果表明:持续经营审计意见对企业投资效率起到了良好的监督作用,能有效缓解代理冲突,优化资源配置效率。

This paper studies the relationship between GCOs and investment efficiency among A-share listed companies using data from Chinag Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges E＇om 2003 to 2015. The study finds out that GCOs will inhibit overinvestment and alleviate underinvestment, whereas management confidence will lead to overinvestment and aggravate underinvestment. As to the interaction among the three factors, GCOs will inhibit overin- vestment caused by management eonfidence, but GCOs alleviation of underinvestment isnt markedly influenced by management confidence, and this phenomenon is more visible in private enterprises. The results show that GCOs plays a monitoring role in boosting enterprises＇ investment efficiency, ease agency conflict effectively, and optimize the resource allocation efficiency.