股权激励与审计收费——来自中国的经验证据

Equity Incentives and Audit Fees——Empirical evidence from China

从内部视角对股权激励经济后果的已有研究并未提供一致的结论,且新兴市场中股权激励与审计收费的关系是一个待研究的问题。本文以2003~2014年我国A股上市公司为研究样本,采用倾向得分匹配法和双重差分的方法,研究股权激励与审计收费定价的关系。不同于基于美国等发达资本市场数据的结果,研究发现:在我国,实施股权激励计划的实验组公司的审计收费要比控制组公司更低,且实施股权激励计划的公司在实施后的审计收费比实施前更低,审计收费降低的程度与股权激励强度成正比,支持了最优契约假说。该结论受管理者权力的影响而存在差异,较高的管理层权力削弱了股权激励与审计收费的关系。研究结果丰富了相关文献,表明股权激励在我国有着积极正面的作用。

Studies on the economic consequences of equity incentives from internal perspective have provided mixed empirical evidence, and the relationship between equity incentives and audit fees in emerging markets remains an open question. This paper studies this question based on data of Chinese A -share listed companies from 2003 to 2014 using propensity score matching method and difference in differences approach. Different from results generated by U. S. firms＇ data ,we find out that compared with control group sample ,audit fee is significantly lower for the treatment group which implement equity incentive plans,and this relationship is more significant after the implementation. Also,the extent of audit fee reduction is proportional to the intensity of equity incentives which supports the optimal contract hypothesis. In addition ,managerial power weakens the relationship between equity incentives and audit fees. The results dem- onstrate that equity incentives have a positive role in our country,enriching literature in this field.