摘要
This paper addresses the relationship between ontology and ethics, as outlined in Charles Taylor＇s essay ＂Ethics and Ontology,＂ problematizing it from a narrative ethics viewpoint. It attempts to overcome the ＂binary＂ dichotomy presented in Taylor＇s essay, insisting instead in favour of an approach that distances itself from both reductionist naturalism and ancient and medieval ontological models. The move towards narrative ethics is positioned in relation to an implicit ontology. Taylor recognizes that man＇s way of life ＂consists of ways of sense making;＂ this human trait thus being an ontological presupposition, or precomprehension. Here, I suggest that this pre-narrative quality is in fact an ex ante projection of the work of meaning-making, arising ex post and, crucially, not universally attainable. If it were, it would be an unwarranted ontologization of features of human moral experience. Organizing the relationship between ontology and ethics within the perspective of narrative ethics does not mean doing away with the ontological dimension. Indeed, as this paper seeks to demonstrate, the ontological background of narrative ethics may be traced from a phenomenology of fragility, exposure, and interdependence. The definition of man as a self-interpreting animal should therefore be delineated in the sense of an endeavour; in this way, the individual can build up his own mediated relation with meaning, and, as a result, the practice of self-narrative becomes available to all.
