管理者攫取私利行为对多元化公司股权激励有效性的影响

The Stock Incentives' Effectiveness of Diversificated Corporate Which is Driven by Manager's Benefits

以委托代理理论为基础,分别用理论模型和实证模型研究多元化公司中管理者攫取私利行为对股权激励有效性的影响。结果表明:管理者利益驱动的多元化公司中,管理者攫取私利水平越高,能够获得的股权激励水平越高,会促进公司多元化水平的上升,降低公司价值。实证研究结果与理论分析结果吻合,并通过稳定性检验。总体而言,管理者利益驱动多元化公司的股权激励失效,股东利益驱动多元化公司的股权激励同样是低效率的,而专业化公司的股权激励起到了促进公司价值增加的作用。

This paper uses the principal - agent theory as the basis to establish the theoretical model to which analyzes the stock incentives, effectiveness of diversificated corporate, which is driven by managers ben-efits. The study finds that： the more private benefits managers can get, the higher stock incentives. The higher stock incentives, the higher diversification level and lower corporate value. In order to test the conclusions, this paper establish the regression models, the results are the same with the theoretical model and are stable. This paper also finds that the stock incentives of diversificated corporate, which is driven by managers5 benefits are invalid. The stock incentives of diversificated corporate, which is driven by shareholdersybenefits are low efficiency. However, the stock incentives of focused corporate are effective.