我国地方官员隐性激励的扭曲与重构——基于政治内部劳动力市场的分析

Distortion and Reconstitution of Chinese Local Official' s Implicit Incentive——A Study based on Political Internal Labor Market

经典的晋升锦标赛理论存在诸多疑问,由此引发地方官员晋升激励的多维探讨,隐性激励是地方官员激励研究的关注点之一。中国转型时期的政治内部劳动力市场具有独特性质,能利用长期雇佣、内部晋升、等级制工资和声誉等对地方官员产生隐性激励,但是政治内部劳动力市场的扭曲也产生了地方官员隐性激励弱化、失效、扭曲和缺位等变异现象。优化地方官员的激励系统必须重构官员隐性激励系统,通过建立退出机制、重建政绩考核体系、改革工资制度和行政体制等具体措施完善政治内部劳动力市场。

The classic promotion tournament theory has many questions, so incentives of local officials should strengthen the study of the implicit incentive. OfficiaFs implicit incentive results from the political inter-nal labor market. In the time of transiton, political internal labor market has unique natures, such as lifetime jobs, internal rumination, rank wages and reputation, which can come into implicit incentives. But the distor-tion of political internal labor market would generate the variation of incentive. Reconstruction of officiaFs im-plicit incentive depends on improving and perfecting the political internal labor market by means of political system reform, which includes exit mechanism, wage system reform, political achievement appraisal and ad-ministration reform.