摘要
在管理者薪酬结构包括部分股权和固定薪水基础上,利用实物期权分析方法,研究了管理者过度自信和过度乐观对企业投资的影响,分析了市场摩擦(税收和破产成本)对企业非效率投资的影晌.数值分析发现,管理者的过度自信和过度乐观都会导致过度投资;通过设计合适的股权和固定薪水,可以在一定程度上缓解管理者过度自信和过度乐观导致的过度投资问题;税收的增加会加重非理性投资的扭曲程度,而破产成本的增加可以缓和非理性投资的扭曲.
In this paper, we assume that manager＇s compensation includes partial shares and fixed salary. According to the real options approach, we examine the effect of manager＇s over-confidence and over-optimism on corporate investment, and then analysis the effect of market friction （tax and default cost） on the inefficiency of the investment. The result shows that over-confidence and over-optimism lead manager over-investment. What＇s more, we can design the fit shares and fixed salary to mit- igate the over-investment generated by manager＇s over-confident and over-optimism. Lastly, tax makes the distortion of inefficiency investment more serious, but default costs can reduce the distortion of the irrational investment.
作者
甘柳
罗鹏飞
杨招军
GAN Liu LUO Pengfei YANG Zhaojun(Finance School, Hunan University of Commerce, Changsha 410205 School of Finance and Statistics, Hunan University, Changsha 410079 School of Finance and Statistics, Hunan University, Changsha 410079 Department of Finance, South University of Science and Technology of China, Shenzhen 418055)
出处
《系统科学与数学》
CSCD
北大核心
2016年第11期1997-2006,共10页
Journal of Systems Science and Mathematical Sciences
基金
国家自然科学基金(71371068
71221001)
国家社会科学基金(15BJY091)
湖南省高校科技创新团队支持计划资助课题
关键词
过度自信
过度乐观
企业投资
Over-confidence, over-optimism, corporate investment
