维持停战与强化威慑——1953—1959年美国在朝鲜半岛的遏制政策及核武器部署

Maintaining Ceasefire and Strengthening Deterrence:U. S. Containment Policy towards North Korea and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons in Korean Peninsula( 1953-1959)

朝鲜战争即将结束之际,艾森豪威尔政府制定了不切实际的对朝鲜政策,企图促成韩国主导下的统一、中立的"朝鲜"。这直接导致在1954年举行的日内瓦会议上,美国拒绝中朝方面提出的政治解决朝鲜问题的相关提议。为避免战后财政赤字加重,减少在朝鲜半岛的军事开支,美国决心维持朝鲜停战状态,并针对韩、朝双方引发战事的可能性而分别拟订了详细的应对举措,防止朝鲜半岛再次爆发使其卷入其中的战争。为化解财政赤字和援助韩国二者之间的矛盾,美国决定在朝鲜半岛部署核武器,以核威慑来保障停战状态的延续。该政策行为强烈刺激了朝鲜民主主义人民共和国谋取核武器的欲念,从而对东北亚区域安全环境乃至美国自身安全造成了极为恶劣的深远影响。

At the end of the Korea War,the Eisenhower Administration made an unreasonable Korean policy,wishing to produce a united and neutral Korean Peninsula dominated by South Korea. That is why the U. S. rejected at the Geneva Conference relevant proposals advanced by China and North Korea. However,in order to avoid its post-war fiscal deficit and reduce the defense spending in the Korean Peninsula,the U. S. government wanted to maintain the ceasefire in Korea and worked out detailed response measures against possible outbreak of war between North and South Korea. To resolve the contradiction between reducing financial deficit and providing assistance to South Korea,the U. S. decided to deploy nuclear weapons in the Korean Peninsula,resorting to nuclear deterrence to ensure the continuation of the truce. This policy has strongly stimulated the desire of the Democratic People＇s Republic of Korea（ DPRK） for nuclear weapons,thus exerting devastating and far-reaching effects on the security environment in Northeast Asia and also on the security of the United States itself.