客户集中、政府干预与公司风险

Customer Concentration,Government Intervention and Corporate Risk

客户是公司重要的利益相关者,客户集中在带来经济利益的同时也可能会增加公司的风险,但现有研究尚未对此展开具体分析。通过对沪深两市A股602家制造业上市公司2007-2013年相关数据的分析,本文发现:客户集中会导致公司风险的上涨;政府干预是影响上述关系的重要因素,减少政府干预能降低客户集中对公司风险的影响。同时,本文还发现,供应商集中与客户集中对公司风险的影响相同。本文首次检验了客户集中对公司风险的影响机理,并将该机理推广到供应链上、下游两个方向,还将纵向关系与横向环境同时纳入到公司风险分析的模型之中。本文的研究结论丰富了风险管理理论和供应链理论,也为实务中的风险控制提供了新思路。

Customer concentration may affect corporate risk. Existing research had little been done about this. Through analyzing relevant data from 2007 to 2013 of 602 listed manufacturing corporations,we find that customer concentration has high positive correlation to corporate risk; decreasing government intervention could reduce the magnification effect of corporate risk caused by customer concentration; that there is the same effect mechanism which is caused by supplier concentration and customer concentration for corporate risk. This research enriches the theory of risk management and supply chain management,and provides new ideas for risk control in practice.