非国有股东提高了国有企业的内部控制质量吗?——来自国有上市公司的经验证据!

Do Non-state-owned Shareholders Improve the Internal Control Quality in SOEs?

混合所有制改革是当前国企改革的重要方向。关于国企混合所有制改革的研究,现有文献大多停留在对混合所有制改革的理论讨论,对混合所有制改革能否提高国有企业经营与治理效率等问题的研究仍缺乏大样本的经验证据。本文以混合所有制改革为制度背景,从内部控制视角,通过手工搜集2008-2015年国有上市公司中非国有股东持股数据与人员委派数据,考察了非国有股东参与水平对国有企业内部控制质量的影响。本文发现,非国有股东在高层治理维度的参与有利于改善国有企业内部控制质量,且上述提升作用只存在于竞争性国有企业与地方国有企业。本文不仅丰富了股东治理与内部控制的相关文献,更直接为混合所有制改革中非国有股东的治理作用提供了经验证据,对进一步推进国有企业改革具有一定的参考价值。

The mixed ownership reform is the most important field in SOEs' reform. Current literatures have studied a lot about this reform's effect in theoretical level,while haven't find direct empirical evidence. Based on this background,our paper investigates how the non-state-owned shareholders improve SOEs' internal control quality,using the hand-collected data. We find that non-state-owned shareholders' participation in top management aspect can significantly improve the quality of SOEs' internal control. Further,we find that this kind of improvement can only exist in SOEs controlled by local government or at competing industries. Our findings not only enrich the research achievements,but also offer some empirical evidence on non-state-owned shareholders' positive functions,which would be helpful for the government to make appropriate policies on the mixed ownership reform.