时尚设计下考虑顾客行为的供应链协调研究

Supply Chain Coordination Under Enhanced Design With Considering Consumer Behavior

文章在市场需求不确定,制造商具备时尚设计能力,顾客消费同时具有炫耀性与策略性的假设下,构建了供应链的定价与订货模型。研究发现,当供应链集中决策时,如果采取时尚设计,销售商会提高商品价格,当时尚设计成本较低时,销售商会增加订货量,当时尚设计成本较高时,销售商会降低订货量。并且研究发现在炫耀性消费较高的市场上,时尚设计可以显著增加供应链的利润,并且顾客的价值感受增量也有助于增加供应链的利润。当供应链分散决策时,批发价契约不利于激励制造商去改进商品的设计,而收益共享契约不仅可以实现供应链的完美协调,而且有利于激励制造商加强对产品的时尚设计。

In this paper, we construct a model of the supply chain＇ s pricing and ordering strategy with uncertain demand, in which the manufacturer has enhanced design ability and consumers have both conspicuous consumption and strategic consumption behavior. It is found that in the centralized supply chain, when the commodities are enhanced design, the retailer will raise the price, increase the ordering quantity if the additional cost is small, and decrease the ordering quantity if the additional cost is big. The research also shows enhanced design can significantly increase the profit of the supply chain when the consumers ＇ conspicuous consumption level is high, and the increment of the consumers＇ valuation also helps to increase the profit of the supply chain. The wholesale price contract is not conducive to encourage the manufacturer to improve the product design. But the revenue sharing contract can realize the supply chain coordination perfectly, and make the profit of the supply chain reasonable distribution, which is conducive to encourage the manufacturer to improve the product design.