政府换届、资本要素错配与经济波动——基于中国34个大中型城市的实证研究

Government Transition,Capital Misallocation and Economic Fluctuation:An Empirical Study Based on Data of 34 Large-Medium Cities in China

基于中国工业企业微观数据和大中型城市党代会召开时间,分析了政府换届引起经济波动的传导机制。首先构建理论框架,换届冲击通过改变受资源约束型企业与资源充裕型企业之间的资本边际生产率的差异,引起要素在企业之间的流动,进而造成总量全要素生产率的变动,表现为地区的经济波动。此外,经验分析的结果也显示出,要素的错配程度与经济波动之间的确存在稳定的正相关关系;党代会召开后的第二年和第三年,经济波动幅度加剧,且在资本要素错配程度高或市场化程度低的地区更为明显。从而从要素动态配置的微观视角解释了中国经济波动的政治周期特性,为实现"稳增长"的发展目标提供参考。

Using micro - data of Chinese industrial firms and data of convening time of local congress of party representatives in 34 large - medium cities, this paper pays attention on what the transmission mechanism for government transition shock to translate into aggregate economic fluctuation. In our theoretical model, the government transition news shock would trigger capital to flow among enterpreneurs through changing ital, furthermore, translating into aggregate TFP fluctuation. In addition, the difference of marginal productivity of cap- the empirical results show that there is a positive relationship between capital misallocation and economic fluctuation. It also indicates that in the second and third year after the convening of local congress of party representatives, the degree of economic fluctuation would aggravates, especially in areas with high level of capital misallocation and low degree of marketization. The finding is an explanation of political cycle characteristics of China＇s economic fluctuation and may provide theoretical support for keeping growth in China.