考虑损失厌恶和退货因素的双渠道定价策略

Pricing policies for a dual-channel supply chain considering loss aversion and returns

该研究了双渠道统一定价和双渠道差别定价问题.考虑了线下渠道的服务水平、线上渠道的退货因素以及消费者的损失厌恶有限理性行为对产品定价策略的影响,得到了不同策略下的最优价格、最优利润和最优服务水平,并分析了退货率对线上渠道价格和需求的影响.最后数值算例表明,在零售商市场份额较高时,制造商应采取双渠道统一定价策略,零售商市场份额较低时,制造商应不开通线上渠道;在双渠道统一定价和差别定价中制造商和零售商的利润均随着退货率的增大而减小;在双渠道差别定价中,制造商和零售商的利润随着损失厌恶程度的增大而增大,而线上与线下的最优价格差随着损失厌恶程度的增大而减小.

In this paper, the pricing policies for dual-chain supply is studied, which consists of a manufacturer and a retailer in a bilateral monopoly setting. Pricing model of online and offline is established in which consumers＇ loss aversion is considered with added value by offline channel and returns from online channel. The centralized and decentralized pricing policies based on Stacklberg games are formulated, and the optimal prices along with expected profits are obtained. The numerical analysis showed that the centralized pricing policy is better when retailer＇s market share is very large, otherwise, it＇s better not to open the online channel for the manufacturer; the profits of manufac- turer and retailer decrease with the increase of return rate both in centralized and decen- tralized pricing channel; the profits of manufacturer and retailer increase with the extent of loss aversion and the optimal price difference between online and offline decreases with the extent of loss aversion in decentralized channel.