所有权性质、稳健性与代理成本——基于在职消费的视角

Property Rights,Conservatism and Agency Cost——A Research Based on Executive Perquisites Perspective

本文以管理层在职消费为切入点,考察在不同程度的会计稳健性下,上市公司的代理成本受到怎样的影响,并在此基础上分析和检验企业所有权性质对这一关系的调节效应。研究发现:一方面,会计稳健性的增强有助于降低管理层在职消费;另一方面,相比于国有控股公司,会计稳健性降低管理层在职消费的作用在非国有控股公司中更为明显。该结果表明,会计稳健性的增强起到了降低代理成本的积极治理作用,并且这种作用在不同所有权性质的企业里存在显著差异。

Taking the executive perquisites as research perspective, this paper discusses the impact of listed companies＇ agency cost under different accounting conservatism extent, and analyzes the moderating effect of property right between accounting conservatism and executive perquisites. The results show that： the growth of accounting conservatism could mitigate executive perquisites, and this correlation is more pronounced in non-state-owned enterprises. This study shows that the enhancement of accounting conservatism could play an important corporate governance role in agency cost reducing, and this impact has significant differences in different ownership companies.