独立董事政治关联的“好”与“坏”——基于上市公司政府补贴的实证研究

Advantage and Disadvantage of Independent Directors' Political Connection——Empirical Study Based on Listed Companies' Government Subsidies

已有关于政治关联的研究取得了丰富的研究成果,识别了政治关联能够为上市公司引入资源的功能。本文利用2004~2015年中国上市公司的数据,通过分析独立董事的政治关联与政府补贴之间的关系以及地区市场化程度对这种关系的调节作用,证明了独立董事政治关联为上市公司提供资源的功能。研究发现:独立董事的政治关联有利于上市公司获取更多的政府补贴,且独立董事政治关联的这种作用在市场化程度较低时更明显。进一步的研究发现,独立董事政治关联所带来的政府补贴并未得到有效的利用。

Existing studies about political connection have achieved abundant research results, some of which identify the role of political connection in introducing resources into listed companies. This paper uses data about China＇ s listed companies from 2004 to 2015 to testify the role of political connection of independent directors in providing resources for listed companies by analyzing the relationship between political connection of independent directors and government subsidies and the moderating effect of marketization degree on this relationship. The results show that, political connec- tion of independent directors is helpful for listed companies to get more government subsidies, and this kind of role is more evident if a firm locates in provinces with low marketization degree. Further examination shows that, the government subsidies gained through independent directors＇ political connection haven＇t been used effectively.