政府激励下秸秆发电供应链的演化博弈模型与分析

Evolutionary Game Model and Analysis of the Straw Power Generation Supply Chain under the Government Incentives

农户供应链的序贯决策模型,得出了供应链三方的最优决策;对比了政府激励下供应链各主体决策及利润的变化,分析了政府激励的重要性;其次,建立了在政府激励作用下,发电厂、中间商之间的演化博弈模型,并得出了合理的激励策略。最后,以某地区秸秆发电供应为例,对电厂和中间商之间的合作关系进行分析,验证模型的正确性。揭示了秸秆发电供应链合作中的规律,对电厂、中间商制定合理的激励策略具有参考价值,同时为政府调控政策提供理论依据,从而建立持久的合作关系,推动秸秆发电行业的发展。

As to the supply of raw materials in the straw power generation, this paper deals with the modeling and analysis on the straw power generation supply chain under the government incentives from the perspective of evo- lutionary game perspective in the first time. First, the influencing factors of straw power generation supply chain are analyzed, and based on the sequential decision-making model of the straw power generation supply chain which is composed of power plant, brokers and farmers, the optimal decision-makings of three participants are obtained. Second, the decision - making and profit change of the supply chain under the government incentives is analyzed, and the importance of the government incentives is approved. Then, under the government incen- tives, the evolutionary game model between power plant and brokers is established and the incentive strategies are obtained. Finally, an example is taken to explain the cooperation relationship between the power plant and brokers in the straw power generation supply chain, which also verifies the proposed models and analysis. This study disclosed cooperation rules in the straw power generation supply chain, and provided the basis for enter- prise decision making of power plants and brokers, as well as government regulation, so as to establish long-term cooperative relationship to promote the development of straw power generation industry.