需求风险下套期保值与市场进入分析

Analysis of Hedging and Market Entry under Demand Risk

需求风险是企业面临的主要风险之一,对企业的生产经营和管理决策具有重要影响。本文考虑由多个风险厌恶企业构成的产品竞争市场,分析了需求风险下企业参与套期保值和市场进入的决策问题。文章首先通过Cournot博弈分析了套期保值对于规避需求风险的作用和意义;然后,探讨了企业参与套期保值和市场进入的决策过程,并给出了三种情形下的市场均衡结构;最后,通过数值实验对结论进行了验证。研究表明:套期保值提高了企业应对需求风险的能力,使企业获得更高的产量和收益;参与套期保值企业数量随着进入市场企业数量的增加而减少;当市场竞争程度或市场费用增加时,将会有更多的企业选择参与套期保值,而选择进入市场的企业会减少。

Demand risk is one of the main risks faced by enterprises, which affects the production management and administrative decision of enterprises. This paper considers a product competition market consisting of multi- ple risk-averse enterprises, and analyses the decision-making problem about hedging and market entry. We first investigate the effect of hedging against the demand risk based on game theory. Then, we discuss the enterprises＇ hedging and market entry strategies, and show three types of market equilibrium structures, respectively. Finally, we provide a numerical illustration to show our analytical results. Our study shows that hedging strategy may im- prove the enterprises＇ ability to avoid the demand risk＇, which leads the enterprises to improve their outputs, and as a result, helps the firms achieve better performances. The number of enterprises with hedging strategy decreases in the total number of enterprises. When the degree of market competition or the market cost increases, there will be more enterprises choosing to adopt hedging strategy, and less choosing to enter the market.