摘要
当今世界,人类正面临着气候变化的严峻威胁,如何解决气候保护公共品的社会困境成为学术探讨的重要问题。在经典的声誉博弈模型基础上,引入气候变化背景和假设条件,构建气候保护声誉博弈模型,从理论上探讨和证明全球气候保护公共品提供中国际合作达成的内在机理和实现条件;在达成合作的基础上,用更简明的无限重复博弈代替和辅以模拟实证,揭示各国维护国际声誉的内在动因。
Nowadays,we are facing the serious threat of global climate change. How to solve the social dilemma of climate protection public goods has become an important problem of academic research. Based on classic reputation game model, this paper introduces the background and assumptions of climate change,builds a new reputation game model about global climate protection,gives the cooperation conditions of global climate protection,and proves that international cooperation is easy to achieve. Furthermore,on the basis of cooperation,this game can be instead of a simpler infinite repeated game,and it reveals the intrinsic motivation of maintaining international reputation.
作者
王方军
张世国
WANG Fang-jun ZHANG Shi-guo(Institute of Quantitative and Technical Economics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 100732, China Graduate School, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, Beijing 102488, China)
出处
《重庆理工大学学报(社会科学)》
CAS
2017年第1期22-27,共6页
Journal of Chongqing University of Technology(Social Science)
基金
国家自然科学基金项目"面向经济复杂性的行为建模与计算实验及应用研究"(71471177)
中英政府间CASS-ESRC合作伙伴项目"个体选择与集体行动的行为相容性及应用"(ES/N00762X/1)
关键词
声誉博弈
气候保护
全球合作
reputation game model
climate protection
global cooperation