两权分离、治理机制和债券融资成本——基于我国公司债发行的经验研究

The Separation of Two Rights, Governance Mechanism and the Cost of Bond Financing——Based on the Empirical Study of Corporate Bond Issuance in China

本文以我国公司债为研究背景,基于代理理论分析两权分离对公司债融资成本的影响。以2007~2014年期间公开发行的公司债为样本,研究发现,两权分离对公司债融资成本的影响在统计和经济意义上都是显著的,控制公司、债券自身特征以及宏观因素影响后,两权分离程度每增加一个单位,公司债融资成本提高约0.16个百分点。进一步研究发现,审计质量、分析师关注度以及制度环境等外部治理机制通过缓解两权分离导致的代理冲突,降低了公司债融资成本。本研究从公司债的角度提供了两权分离导致代理冲突,进而增加债券融资成本的直接经验证据,丰富了理论文献并具有一定的实践意义。

Under the background of the issuance of corporate bonds in China, this paper analyzes the influence of the separation of control right and cash flow right on the financing cost of corporate bonds based on agency theory. Using the public issuance of corporate bonds from 2007 to 2014, we find that the impact of the separation of two rights on the financing cost of corporate bonds is statistical and economical significant. After controlling corporation and bond characteristics and macro factors, the increase of every unit in the degree of two rights separation will cause the cost of corporate bonds to increase by 0.16 percentage points. Furthermore, results indicate that higher audit quality, more analyst attention and better institutional environment can ease the agency conflict caused by the separation of two rights and then reduce the financing cost of corporate bonds. From the perspective of corporate bond financing, this paper provides direct empirical evidence about the effect of two rights separation on agency conflicts, and then the cost of bond financing, enriching the theoretical literature and getting some practical significance.